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Six years ago the legal position of individuals in the instigation of proceedings in cases related 
to anti–competitive practices was significantly weakened in the Polish legal system.  
The justification for this was an opinion that in proceedings conducted under public law only the 
most serious competition law violations should be examined. The Author examines whether Polish 
law excessively restricts the protection of individuals against competition law violations.  
One may find a description of the system of protection of individuals against competition law 
violations in Polish law in the article. The Author also examines the problem of public and private 
interest in protecting against anti–competitive practices. Remarks relating to the issue of  
the European Union and Polish constitutional standard can be found in the article as well.  
The Author concludes that it is necessary to prepare a reform which would render the private 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2007 a reform of the Polish competition law was implemented. One 
of the most important changes introduced by the new Act on Competition 
and Consumer Protection1 was depriving individuals of the possibility of 
filing motions for instituting antitrust proceedings, which would be 
binding upon the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer 
Protection. 
 Six years following the reform’s implementation it is worth examining 
whether it does not excessively restrict the protection of individuals against 
competition law violations. Particularly interesting is the question of 
whether Polish law is in line with European Union standards and with  
the requirements which can be inferred from the Polish Constitution. 
 
I. PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS AGAINST COMPETITION LAW VIOLATIONS 
IN POLISH LAW 
 
 According to Article 49.1 of the Act on Competition and Consumer 
Protection which is currently in force, antitrust proceedings in cases related 
to anti–competitive practices, practices violating collective consumer 
interests or involving imposition of fines shall be instituted on an ex officio 
basis. Article 44.1 of the previous Act on Competition and Consumer 
Protection2 stated that the antitrust proceedings in cases related to  
anti–competitive practices, control of concentrations, or matters of practices 
infringing collective consumer interests should be instituted upon a motion 
or ex officio. Article 84.1 stated that the motion for instituting antitrust 
proceedings in respect of a suspicion of an infringement of the provisions 
of the Act could be filed by:  
 entrepreneur or association of entrepreneurs, which prove their 
legal interest,  
 territorial self–government body, 
 
                                                     
1 Act of 16.02.2007, Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] No. 50, item 331 with amendments. 
2 Act of 15.12.2000, Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] No. 122, item 1319 with amendments. 
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 body of State inspection, or 
 Consumer Ombudsman. 
The legal position of individuals in the institution of proceedings  
in cases related to anti–competitive practices had been significantly 
weakened by 2007. According to Article 86.1 of the Act on Competition and 
Consumer Protection which is currently in force, everyone may submit to 
the President of the Office a written notification concerning a suspicion that 
anti–competitive practices have taken place. Such notification must be 
justified. Note that the President is not bound by the notification and he is 
not even required to issue an administrative decision if he is not going to 
institute any proceedings. That regulation has deprived individuals 
interested in instituting administrative procedure against the will of the 
President of the Office of the possibility of seeking recourse in a court of 
law. Moreover, according to the opinion expressed in Polish jurisprudence, 
another consequence of the 2007 changes is depriving individuals of  
the status of parties to proceedings in cases related to anti–competitive 
practices, because it has started to be reserved only for entities against 
which the proceedings were instituted3.  
 In the justification contained in the draft of the Polish Act on 
Competition and Consumer Protection from 2007 one may find an opinion 
that in proceedings conducted under public law only the most serious 
competition law violations should be examined. It also underlines the fact 
that individuals who suffered damage as a consequence of competition law 
violation should pursue their rights in proceedings before civil courts4. 
 The starting point for the reflections on how the 2007 competition law 
reform affects the situation of individuals who are threatened by 
competition law violations or have suffered damage as a result thereof 
should be a comparative analysis of possible decisions which can be issued 
                                                     
3 See A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik, T. Skoczny, M. Szydło, Nowa uokik z 2007 r. [New Act of 2007 
on Competition and Consumer Protection], Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego 
[Economic Law Review] 2007, no. 4, p. 5.  
4 Uzasadnienie rządowego projektu ustawy o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów  
[Justification of the Governmental Draft of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection], druk 
sejmowy nr 1110 z dnia 26.10.2006, see http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki5ka.nsf/ 
0/06AED0325C1F3B3FC125722600445A4A/$file/1110.pdf, pp. 18, 19 [last accessed: 
21.8.2013]. 
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as a result of administrative competition law proceedings and in a civil law 
procedure. 
 Article 10 of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection states 
that the President of the Office shall issue a decision recognizing the 
practice as anti–competitive and ordering its cessation, if he finds that  
the prohibition specified in Article 6 or 9 of the Act, or in Article 101 or 102 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union was infringed. 
Contrary to purely semantic interpretation, a line of reasoning according to 
which decisions of the President of the Office may go further than 
confirming that violation of Article 6 or 9 of the Act, or of Article 101 or 102 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union occurred, should 
be accepted. That conclusion is supported from the functional point of view 
– it increases the effectiveness of competition law enforcement – and  
by the rule stating that synonymous interpretation is unacceptable5.  
The assumption that according to Article 10 of the Act on Competition and 
Consumer Protection, the President of the Office may issue only purely 
declaratory decisions, which can only confirm that violation occurred, 
would mean that recognizing the practice as anti–competitive is 
tantamount to ordering cessation of the violation6. 
 In the Polish legal system, the most important, but not the only civil 
instrument of competition law enforcement is Article 415 of the Civil Code. 
It provides that anyone who by fault on his part causes damage to another 
person is obliged to remedy it7. 
The experiences of many countries have proved that without special 
regulations plaintiffs are at a disadvantage in compensatory cases in which 
the damage occurred as a result of competition law violation. Estimating 
damage and collecting evidence is particularly difficult for them. In 2004, 
M. Monti, the former European Commission Commissioner, claimed that 
in reality the possibility of enforcing competition law by civil law means 
                                                     
5 See L. Morawski, Wykładnia w orzecznictwie sądów [Interpretation in Case Law], Toruń:  
Dom Organizatora TNOiK 2002, p. 144. 
6 Nevertheless it should be noted that the opposite idea has been also expressed in Polish 
legal literature and that the problem has not been resolved by the case law – see  
E. Modzelewska–Wąchal, Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz  
[Act on Competition and Consumer Protection. Commentary], Warszawa: Twigger 2002, p. 125. 
7 Act of 23.04.1963, Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] No. 16, item 93 with amendments; Article 415. 
213   |   Protection of Individuals Against Competition Law Violations in the Polish Legal System 
was extremely limited8. Following his way of reasoning, many European 
Union Member States developed regulations which strengthen the position 
of plaintiffs in cases for damages when the damage is a result of  
a competition law violation9. For example, in Germany, in 2005 the so 
called seventh cartel novel was passed. It introduced the follow on rule, 
rules for estimating damages which are favorable for plaintiffs, and 
excluded passing–on defence10.  
 The Polish legislator has undertaken nothing to strengthen the 
situation of plaintiffs seeking damages resulting from competition law 
violation. The opinion that the likelihood of receiving compensation in 
such cases is very limited, if not purely theoretical, should not be 
controversial11.  
Under Polish law, declaratory legal action as a civil law instrument of 
competition law enforcement can be an alternative to a damages claim. 
Pursuant to Article 189 of the Code of Civil Procedure12 the plaintiff may 
demand that the court establish the existence or non–existence of a legal 
relationship or of a right if he proves his legal interest to do so. 
 The weakening of the protection of individuals against competition 
law violations in proceedings before the President of Competition and 
Consumers Office should result in adopting a plaintiff–friendly attitude by 
allowing a plaintiff to file a declaratory action. Such action may be allowed 
when no damage has occurred yet and in situations where Article 189 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure serves the interests of individuals better than  
                                                     
8 M. Monti, Private litigation as a key component to public enforcement of competition rules and the 
first conclusions on the implementation of the new Merger Regulation, Fiesole, 17.09.2004, p. 2, 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/04/ 
403&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en [last accessed: 21.8.2013]. 
9 See. C. Hodges, Competition Enforcement, Regulation and Civil Justice: What is the Case?, 
Common Market Law Review 2006, no. 5, p. 1396; I. Segal, Public v. Private Enforcement  
of Antitrust Law: A Survey, European Competition Law Review 2007, no. 5, p. 306. 
10 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, BGBl. I (No. 44), p. 2114 et seq. – see  
M. Będkowski–Kozioł, Prywatne wdrażanie prawa antymonopolowego w RFN [Private 
Enforcement of Antitrust Law in Germany], Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego 
[Economic Law Review] 2007, no. 12, p. 15. 
11 See I. B. Nestoruk, Nowa ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów [New Act on 
Competition and Consumer Protection], dodatek do Monitora Prawniczego [Supplement to Law 
Monitor] 2007, no. 15, p. 8. 
12 Act of 17.11.1964, Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] No. 43, item 293 with amendments; Article 189. 
214   |   Marek Krzysztof Kolasiński  
a damages claim13. It must be underlined that this question is highly 
controversial and that, to the best of my knowledge, Article 189 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure has never been applied in practice in cases related to 
competition law.  
 Even if the most friendly attitude towards individuals threatened or 
damaged by competition law violations with regard to Article 189 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure was adopted, it would not lead to any increase in 
protection which would correspond with the level existing before the 2007 
reform. This is a consequence of the fact that according to Article 189 of  
the Code of Civil Procedure, only declaratory decisions may be given.  
The range of decisions which may be issued by the President of 
Competition and Consumers Protection Office seems to be wider.  
 Note that pursuant to Article 10 of the Act on Competition and 
Consumer Protection, the President of Competition and Consumers 
Protection Office enforces not only Polish, but also the European Union 
competition law. The influence of that fact upon the current state of the 
Polish competition law enforcement system is analyzed under point 3 of 
this paper. 
 
II. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTEREST IN PROTECTION AGAINST  
ANTI–COMPETITIVE PRACTICES 
 
 One of the most important general ideas behind the 2007 competition 
law reform was a clear separation of public and private law elements.  
In the justification of the draft of the new Act on Competition and 
Consumer Protection, there is a statement according to which “the point is 
to enable the President of the Office to enforce in practice, solely on the 
basis of public interest, the competition law against undertakings distorting 
(…) fair competition. This is because the President of the Office,  
by definition, does not realize individuals’ interests”14.  
                                                     
13 See A. Szpunar, Ustalenie odszkodowania w prawie cywilnym [Establishment of Damages  
in Civil Law], Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Prawnicze 1975, p. 203; J. Klimkowicz, Glosa  
do wyroku SN z dnia 13.04.1965 r., II CR 266/64 [Comment to the Judgment of the Supreme Court  
of 13.04.1965, II CR 266/64], Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich i Komisji Arbitrażowych  
[Case Law of Polish Courts and Arbitration Commissions] 1966, no. 7–8, item 66, p. 334. 
14 Supra note 4, p. 19. 
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 It is worth comparing the cited part of the justification with opinions 
expressed in United Stated jurisprudence. E. Macintyre underlined that the 
view according to which private plaintiffs fulfill a quasi–public role in 
antitrust cases is widely accepted15. A. P. Komninos claims that “the private 
litigant in an US antitrust has been considered a «private attorney–
general»”16. This is similar to the way of reasoning by D. K. Meyers and  
I. Horovitz17 as regards injunction relief. They stressed that “not only can 
private parties be protected through careful use of injunction relief, but 
public purposes may be served as well”18.  
 The opinion of the President of the Office in the decision of  
24 September 2004 is also interesting. According thereto, before starting to 
assess behavior based on competition law rules, it is necessary to consider 
the issue of public interest19. This problem was raised even more explicitly 
in the decision of the President of the Office of 17 June 2003, in which one 
may find a statement that “to recognize that a case has a competition law 
character, it is necessary to establish if public interest was violated”20.  
 Every competition law violation is detrimental to public interest. 
Providing individuals with effective instruments for enforcing private 
competition law is justified from the perspective of both public and  
private interest.  
 
III. THE EUROPEAN UNION STANDARD 
 
 In the justification of the draft of the 2007 Act on Competition and 
Consumer Protection there is a statement that “the change was inspired by 
the European Union policy, which aims to promote the private pursuit of 
                                                     
15 See. E. Macintyre, The Role of the Private Litigant in Antitrust Enforcement, The Antitrust 
Bulletin 1962, p. 114. 
16 A. P. Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement, Oxford, Portland, Oregon:  
Hart Publishing 2008, p. 9. 
17 D. K. Meyers, I. Horovitz, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Works Occasionally:  
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma v. NCAA, a Case in Point, Oklahoma Law  
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claims arising from the European Union competition law”21. The above 
encourages us to reflect upon the standpoint represented by the European 
Union institutions as regards the problem connected with private 
instruments of competition law enforcement. 
 It is beyond any doubt that the European Union recommends that 
Member States should develop some private instruments for enforcing 
competition law. The opinion of the European Commission is clear.  
The Green Paper on “Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules” 
states that “While Community law therefore demands an effective system 
for damages claims for infringements of antitrust rules, this area of the law 
in the 25 Member States presents a picture of «total underdevelopment»”. 
 The Manfredi case22 dated 13 July 2006 gives a full picture of the 
standpoint represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union.  
The court expressed an opinion that “as regards the possibility of seeking 
compensation for loss caused by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict 
or distort competition, it should be recalled that the full effectiveness of 
Article 81 EC and, in particular, the practical effect of the prohibition laid 
down in Article 81(1) EC would be put at risk if it were not open to any 
individual to claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract or by 
conduct liable to restrict or distort competition”.  
 In the justification of the Manfredi judgment one may also find  
a statement that “(i)n the absence of Community rules governing the 
matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to 
designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down  
the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights 
which individuals derive directly from Community law, provided that 
such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic 
actions (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render practically 
impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by 
Community law (principle of effectiveness)”. Underlining the principle of 
effectiveness is fully in line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, which in Article 47 provides that everyone whose rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right 
                                                     
21 Supra note 4, p. 21. 
22 [2006] ECR I – 6619. 
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to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions 
laid down in this Article. 
 According to Article 7.1 of the Council Regulation 1/200323 the 
Commission in cases connected with Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty may 
act on a complaint or on its own initiative. Article 5.1 of the Commission 
Regulation 773/200424 provides that the complaint may be lodged by any 
natural and legal persons which can show a legitimate interest. Moreover, 
according to Article 6, the person who filed the complaint is allowed to 
participate in the proceedings. Article 7.1 provides that where the 
Commission considers that on the basis of the information in its possession 
there are insufficient grounds for acting on a complaint, it shall inform  
the complainant of its reasons and set a time–limit within which  
the complainant may make known his or her views in writing25. 
 It should be particularly stressed that if the complainant makes known 
its views within the time–limit set by the Commission and the written 
submissions made by the complainant do not result in a different 
assessment of the complaint, the Commission shall reject the complaint by 
issuing a decision (Article 7.2). According to the established case law, such 
decision may be challenged in a court26. Nevertheless, the Commission, 
as the public enforcer, has a margin of discretion to set priorities in its 
enforcement activity and is entitled to give different degrees of priority to 
complaints made to it. The Commission may refer to the Union interest 
presented by a case as a criterion of priority and may reject a complaint 
when it considers that the case does not display a sufficient Union interest 
to justify further investigation27. 
 
                                                     
23 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16.12.2002 on the implementation of the rules  
on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. 
24 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 773/2004 of 7.04.2004 relating to the conduct  
of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. 
25 See E. Elhauge, D. Gerardin, Global Competition Law and Economics, Oxford, Portland:  
Hart Publishing 2007, p. 42. 
26 See Bureau Européen des Médias et de l’Industrie Musicale (BEMIM) v. Commission  
of the European Communities, [1995] ECR II–147; point 77 of the Commission Notice  
on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty 
[2004] O. J. C 101/65; J. Faull, A. Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition, New York:  
Oxford University Press 2007, p. 122. 
27 See points 27 and 28 of the Commission Notice, supra note 26. 
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IV. POLISH CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD 
 
 The core of the right to a fair trial in the Polish Constitution is created 
by Articles 45.1 add 77.2. The first provision states that everyone shall have 
the right to a fair and public hearing of his case, without undue delay, 
before a competent, impartial, and independent court. According to the 
latter, no statutes shall bar the recourse by any person to the courts in 
pursuit of claims alleging infringement of freedoms or rights. 
 In the judgment of 10 May 200028 the Polish Constitutional Court 
expressed a view that “as long as Article 45.1 positively formulates  
the right to a fair trial, Article 77.2 contains the prohibition of preventing  
a person from seeking recourse in the courts for enforcing violated rights 
and freedoms and thus complements (supplements, develops) the right to  
a fair trial. The universal right to a fair trial means that no–one may be 
prevented from seeking recourse in the courts in the scope determined by 
Article 77.2 of the Constitution”.  
 In the said judgment, the Polish Constitutional Court also concludes 
that “there are no doubts that the subjective scope of the right to a fair trial 
includes not only criminal, but also civil and administrative cases”. It is 
particularly important that the Court is of the opinion that “undoubtedly, 
the category of rights decided by courts encompasses not only rights that 
are protected directly by constitutional guaranties, but also all remaining 
ones stemming from all binding regulations under substantive law”.  
That idea was further elaborated by the Constitutional Court in the 
judgment of 18 May 200429, where one may find the following sentence 
“from Article 45.1 of the Constitution stems the clear will of the legislator 
that the scope of the right to a fair trial encompasses the broadest range  
of cases possible, which fully justifies the application of the interpretative 
rule forbidding restrictive interpretation of the right to a fair trial”. 
 It should be stressed that, as was already mentioned, according to 
European Union case law, competition law creates rights for individuals 
                                                     
28 Application no. K 21/99, Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego – Zbiór Urzędowy 
[Constitutional Court Review – Official Review] 2000, no. 4, item 109. 
29 Application no. SK 38/03, Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego – Zbiór Urzędowy 
[Constitutional Court Review – Official Review] 2004, no. 5/A, item 45. 
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who have suffered a damage or are in danger of suffering a damage as  
a result of its violation. The evolution of Polish case law goes in the same 
direction30. It seems to be right to accept the opinion that the right to a fair 
trial protects those who have suffered a damage and those who are in 
danger of suffering a damage as a result of competition law violation. 
 Thinking about the 2007 competition law reform in Poland one should 
also have in mind Article 31.3 of the Polish Constitution. It states that any 
limitation in respect of the exercise of constitutional freedoms and rights 
may be imposed only by statute and only when deemed necessary in  
a democratic state in order to protect the state’s security or public order,  
or to protect the natural environment, health or public morals, or the 
freedoms and rights of other persons. Such limitations shall not violate  
the essence of freedoms and rights. 
 The fact of depriving individuals in 2007 of the possibility of filing 
motions for instituting antitrust proceedings in cases related to  
anti–competitive practices, which would be binding upon the President of 
the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, was justified only by 
arguments derived from praxeology, i.e. that the solution was supposed  
to render the work of the President of the Competition and Consumes 
Office more effective. The link between the effectiveness of public 
administration and prerequisites established in Article 31.3 of the Polish 
Constitution is too distant to consider the limitation of the protection of 
individuals against anti–competitive practices as being in line with the 
Constitution. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not establish the manner 
in which the protection should be provided. In the said judgment of 2000, 
the Polish Constitutional Court held that in such cases it is necessary  
to take into account the legal system as a whole. Full implementation  
of the constitutional standards requires the limitation of the effectiveness  
of administrative protection of individuals against anti–competitive 
practices to be compensated by increasing the effectiveness of the relevant 




                                                     
30 See Jurkowska, Miąsik, Skoczny, Szydło, supra note 3, pp. 5, 6. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The mere fact of depriving individuals of the possibility of filing 
motions for instituting antitrust proceedings, which would be binding 
upon the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, 
violated neither the European Union nor Polish constitutional standards. 
The 2007 reform should have been accompanied by changes which would 
increase the effectiveness of the private enforcement of competition law. 
 The Polish system of protecting individuals’ rights arising from 
competition law does not meet the requirements established in European 
Union law or in the Polish Constitution. It is thus necessary to prepare  
a reform which would render the private enforcement of competition law 
really effective. 
 
 
 
